SMU Law Review
Volume 33

Issue 3

Article 9

January 1979

The Validity of Consequential Damage Disclaimers Following
Failure of Essential Purpose of an Exclusive Remedy: S.M. Wilson
& (and) Co. v. Smith International, Inc.
John V. Jansonius

Recommended Citation
John V. Jansonius, Note, The Validity of Consequential Damage Disclaimers Following Failure of Essential
Purpose of an Exclusive Remedy: S.M. Wilson & (and) Co. v. Smith International, Inc., 33 SW L.J. 930
(1979)
https://scholar.smu.edu/smulr/vol33/iss3/9

This Case Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at SMU Scholar. It has been
accepted for inclusion in SMU Law Review by an authorized administrator of SMU Scholar. For more information,
please visit http://digitalrepository.smu.edu.

SOUTHWESTERN LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 33

a move toward a more active role on the part of the courts in the area of
social policy.
Sharon S Millians

The Validity of Consequential Damage Disclaimers Following
Failure of Essential Purpose of an Exclusive Remedy: S.M.
Wilson & Co. v. Smith International, Inc.
S.M. Wilson & Company contracted to construct a mine shaft for the
Ayrshire Coal Company. In order to obtain the equipment necessary to
drill the tunnel for the shaft, Wilson negotiated with a heavy machinery
manufacturer, Smith International, for the purchase of a rock tunnel boring machine.' Subsequently, Wilson and Smith International entered into
a contract that included four provisions regarding warranties and damages: (1) a limited warranty that the tunnel boring machine would be free
from defects in material and workmanship, (2) an exclusive remedy of repair or replacement of defective parts, (3) a disclaimer of all other warranties, and (4) a disclaimer of consequential damages. 2 The parties further
1. A rock tunnel boring machine is a complicated and expensive piece of equipment.
Construction of the machine requires that the parts be manufactured and assembled at the
plant, and then disassembled for transportation to and installation at the jobsite. In the
course of negotiation Smith International was fully apprised of the details of the Ayrshire
project, including the nature of the rock that would be encountered by the tunnel boring
machine.
2. The original parties to the contract were McGuire Shaft & Tunnel Corp., a predecessor of S.M. Wilson & Co., and the Calweld Division of Smith International, Inc. Hereinafter, they will be referred to respectively as "Wilson" and "Smith International."
The applicable provisions of the contract are as follows:
WARRANTY:
Calweld warrants the Calweld Machine ("machine") described in the specifications incorporated in this contract to be free from defects in material and
workmanship under normal use and service for which it was intended if, but
only if, it has been properly installed and operated. Calweld's obligation
under this warranty is limited to replacing or repairing, free of charge, ...
any defective part or parts of the machine that were manufactured by Calweld
....
This shall be the limit of Calweld's liability for any breach of warranty.
THIS WARRANTY IS EXPRESSLY IN LIEU OF ALL OTHER WARRANTIES, EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING ANY IMPLIED WARRANTY OF MERCHANTABILITY OR FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
PURPOSE NOT SET FORTH IN A WRITING SIGNED BY AN AUTHORIZED REPRESENTATIVE OF CALWELD. Calweld shall not be liable for any loss or damage resulting, directly or indirectly, from the use or
loss of use of the machine. Without limiting the generality of the foregoing
this exclusion from liability embraces the purchaser's expenses for downtime
or for making up downtime ....
Calweld neither assumes nor authorizes
any person to assume for it any other liability in connection with the sale or
use of the Calweld machine, and there are no oral agreements or warranties
collateral to or affecting this agreement.
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agreed that Smith International would provide a competent tunnel boring
specialist to supervise installation at the jobsite by Wilson personnel.3
When the tunnel boring machine was completed and installed at the jobsite, the machine failed to function properly despite Smith International's
repeated efforts to repair.4 As a result, Wilson fell behind schedule on the
Ayrshire project and incurred substantial damages in the form of lost profits, additional labor costs, and additional equipment costs. 5 After nearing
completion of the shaft's construction, Wilson discovered that improper
installation of the tunnel boring machine was the cause of the machine's
inability to perform properly. Wilson sued Smith International,6 stipulating that it suffered only consequential damages as a result of the machine's
nonperformance. The district court granted Smith International's motion
for summary judgment on grounds that the clause excluding liability for
consequential damages was dispositive. Wilson appealed to the Ninth Circuit. Held,affirmed: a freely negotiated consequential damages disclaimer
survives failure of essential purpose of an exclusive remedy. S.M. Wilson
& Co. V. Smith International,Inc., 587 F.2d 1363 (9th Cir. 1978).
I.

U.C.C. SECTION 2-719

Subsection 2-719(l)(a) of the Uniform Commercial Code provides that
contracting parties may "limit or alter the measure of damages recoverable
under this Article" subject to the provisions of subsections 2-719(2) and
(3).7 The purpose of this provision is to maximize freedom of contract
3. The parties attempted to allocate specifically the costs and risks of shipment and
installation:
SHIPPING AND INSTALLATION:
The machine will be delivered to the purchaser F.O.B. Calweld Plant, .
disassembled if necessary in component units suitable for shipment. Shipment
from Calweld Plant . . . to job site will be made at the cost and risk of the
Purchaser. Labor and the use of machinery to complete the erection of the
machine will be provided by the Purchaser. Calweld is to provide supervision
of erection as outlined under "Installation Personnel."
INSTALLATION PERSONNEL:
Calweld will provide one competent tunnel boring machine specialist free of
charge, to supervise installation, to demonstrate initial operation, and train
customer's operator, for a period of 30 working days.
4. Smith International made repeated attempts to discover the source of the machine's
difficulties and provided Wilson with replacement parts upon request. Nevertheless, it was
evident that the machine was defective, and Smith International did not claim otherwise.
5. Wilson alleged actual damages totalling $1,844,599.
6. Wilson alleged eight causes of action: (1) breach of contract for failure to reassemble the machine properly; (2) breach of contract for failure to provide a competent supervisor; (3) breach of an implied warranty of fitness; (4) negligence in design; (5) negligence in
construction; (6) negligence in reassembly; (7) negligence in failing to provide a competent
reassembly supervisor; and (8) misrepresentation as to the machine's boring rate.
7. U.C.C. § 2-719 provides:
(1) Subject to the provisions of subsections (2) and (3) of this section and
of the preceding section on liquidation and limitation of damages,
(a) the agreement may provide for remedies in addition to or in substitution for those provided in this Article and may limit or alter the measure of
damages recoverable under this Article, as by limiting the buyer's remedies
to return of the goods and repayment of the price or to repair and replacement of non-conforming goods or parts; and
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without sanctioning the implementation of egregious terms by parties in a
strong negotiating posture.8 Thus, under subsection 2-719(l)(b) an exclusive remedy must be clearly labeled as such or it is presumed to be cumulative with those provided in article 2.' More importantly, if an exclusive
remedy has failed of its essential purpose, under subsection 2-719(2) all
other remedies in article 2 become available."
Determining when an exclusive remedy fails of its essential purpose I
under subsection 2-719(2)2 and the effect that failure has on a consequential damages disclaimer under subsection 2-719(3)' 3 frequently troubles the
(b) resort to a remedy as provided is optional unless the remedy is expressly agreed to be exclusive, in which case it is the sole remedy.
8. See id Comment 1.
9. Id Comment 2.
10. Id. Comment 1.
11. There are two general fact situations in which exclusive remedies have been held to
fail of their essential purpose. The first and most common situation occurs when the party
responsible for providing the remedy is either unwilling or unable to do so. The second fact
situation occurs when defects in the goods are latent and not discoverable by reasonable
inspection upon receipt.
To date only one case has held that the latent-defect situation constitutes a failure of
essential purpose. In Wilson Trading Corp. v. David Ferguson, Ltd., 23 N.Y.2d 398, 401,
244 N.E.2d 685, 686, 297 N.Y.S.2d 108, 110 (1968), a contract for the sale of yarn denied the
buyer any claim "if made after wearin$, knitting, or processing, or more than 10 days after
receipt of shipment." The yarn faded m processing and the buyer refused to make further
payments. Seller thereafter sued for the price and was granted summary judgment on the
ground that the time limitation in the contract barred any claim of breach of warranty. The
New York Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the time limitation was an exclusive
remedy and that it had failed of its essential purpose. One commentator has severely criticized this decision as a misreading of § 2-719(2) that disrupted a clear allocation of risks.
See Comment, Time Limitations on Warranties.- Application and Validity Under the U.C.C.,

II

B.C. INDUS. & COM. L. REV. 340, 348-49 (1969-1970).

In either fact situation, however, the courts have not explained what factors cause an
exclusive remedy to fail of its essential purpose. Rather, they have turned to Comment 1,
which states that § 2-719(2) is applicable when circumstances cause an otherwise "fair and
reasonable" remedy to "deprive either party of the substantial value of the bargain." In
general, any time a seller is unable to conform goods to the provisions of the agreement by
exercise of an exclusive remedy of repair or replacement within a reasonable time after
discovery of the defects, the courts have held that the buyer has suffered substantial value
depreciation. See Riley v. Ford Motor Co., 442 F.2d 670 (5th Cir. 1971); Moore v. Howard
Pontiac-American, Inc., 492 S.W.2d 227 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1972). Nevertheless, at least one
case has held that an exclusive remedy does not fail of its essential purpose unless the seller
acted in bad faith by refusing to honor the exclusive remedy. Lankford v. Rogers Ford
Sales, 478 S.W.2d 248 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1972, writ refd, n.r.e.).
Only one case, Beal v. General Motors Corp., 354 F. Supp. 423, 426 (D. Del. 1973), has
attempted to explain the purposes underlying an exclusive remedy: an exclusive remedy has
the dual purpose of (1) providing the seller with an opportunity to minimize its risk of liability while making the goods conforming, and (2) enabling the buyer to acquire conforming
goods within a reasonable time after the defect is discovered. Thus, the majority of cases m
the standard § 2-719(2) fact situation accurately reflect those underlying purposes by holding that failure of essential purpose occurs when the seller is unable to repair within a reasonable time after the defect is discovered.
12. U.C.C. § 2-719(2) provides: "Where circumstances cause an exclusive or limited
remedy to fail of its essential purpose, remedy may be had as provided in this Act."
13. U.C.C. § 2-719(3) provides: "Consequential damages may be limited or excluded
unless the limitation or exclusion is unconscionable. Limitation of consequential damages
for injury to the person in the case of consumer goods is prima facie unconscionable but
limitation of damages where the loss is commercial is not."
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courts.' 4 To date, few courts have undertaken a separate analysis of the
purposes of subsections 2-719(2) and 2-719(3) with a view towards establishing a logical relationship between the two provisions.' 5 This failure
may be explained partially by the confusion of section 2-719 with other
Code sections' 6 and the ambiguous nature of section 2-719 itself.' 7 Nevertheless, since consequential damages are frequently the only significant
amount involved in a commercial suit, 1 8 a clear understanding of the relationship between an exclusive remedy and a consequential damages disclaimer is important.
Failure of essential purpose of an exclusive remedy does not automatically result in failure of the consequential damages disclaimer.' 9 Subsection 2-719(3) tests the validity of a consequential damages disclaimer by its
conscionability, 2° whereas subsection 2-719(2) tests the validity of an ex14. The failure of essential purpose issue naturally precedes the consequential damages
issue. S.M. Wilson & Co. falls within the standard failure of essential purpose fact situation.
See note 11 supra. This Note concentrates on the effect that failure of essential purpose has
on a consequential damages disclaimer.
15. See generally Anderson, Failure of Essential Purpose and Essential Failureon Purpose.- .4 Look at Section 2-719 of the Uniform Commercial Code, 31 Sw. L.J. 759 (1977);
Eddy, On the "Essential"Purposesof Limited Remedies." The Metaphysics of UCC Section 2719(2), 65 CALIF. L. REV. 28 (1977).
16. In particular, § 2-719 may be confused with the warranty disclaimer provision of
§ 2-316 or the liquidated damages provision of § 2-718. See, e.g., Farmers Union Grain
Terminal Ass'n v. Nelson, 223 N.W.2d 494 (N.D. 1974). For discussion of the three abovementioned Code sections, see Anderson, supra note 15, at 759-61, and Weintraub, Disclaimer
of Warrantiesand Limitationof DamagesforBreach of Warranty Underthe UCC, 53 TEXAS
L. REV. 60 (1974).
17. Some commentators have suggested that the ambiguous nature of art. 2 in general,
and the remedy limitation provisions in particular, are necessary consequences of Professor
Llewellyn's desire to see the Code evolve in patterns appropriate to different business contexts. Thus Professor Eddy points out: "What section 2-719(2) prescribes is not a rule of
law, but a principle in accordance with which the courts shall find the 'immanent law of the
transaction.'" Eddy, supra note 15, at 92 (citing K. LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION: DECIDING APPEALS 122 (1960)). For contrasting viewpoints on Professor Llewellyn's approach to art. 2, compare Leff, Unconscionabilityand the Code-The Emperor'sNew
Clause, 115 U. PA. L. REV. 485, 541-58 (1967), with Ellinghaus, In Defense of Unconscionability, 78 YALE L.J. 757 (1969).
18. Anderson, supra note 15, at 774. In S.M. Wilson & Co., for example, no general
damages were pleaded although there were almost $2,000,000 in consequential damages at
issue. In comparison, the purchase price of the tunnel boring machine was $550,000.
19. Pursuant to § 2-719(2) when an exclusive remedy fails of its essential purpose, the
buyer may disregard that remedy provision of the agreement and pursue the remedies to
which he would have otherwise had recourse. J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, HANDBOOK OF THE
LAW UNDER THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 12-10, at 379-82 (1972). Based upon this
provision Professors White and Summers conclude that, absent a showing of unconscionability, an independent consequential damages disclaimer will not survive failure of essential
purpose of an exclusive remedy. Id § 12-11, at 396. This position is erroneous, however,
for it fails to consider that the consequential damages disclaimer is governed by a separate
subsection. See notes 12 & 13 supra and accompanying text.
20. See note 13 supra. Section 2-302 sets forth the effect of an unconscionable contract
or clause on the determination of the rights of the parties:
(1) If the court as a matter of law finds the contract or any clause of the
contract to have been unconscionable at the time it was made the court may
refuse to enforce the contract, or it may enforce the remainder of the contract
without the unconscionable clause, or it may so limit the application of any
unconscionable clause as to avoid any unconscionable result.
(2) When it is claimed or appears to the court that the contract or any clause
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clusive remedy according to whether it fulfills its essential purpose. 2 The
distinction between the two tests is significant. Unconscionability is determined according to the circumstances existing at the time of the making of
the contract, whereas the failure of a remedy's essential purpose is determined by circumstances relating to performance of the contract. 22 At the
time a contract is entered into, a buyer generally assumes that consequential damages will be avoided by the seller's prompt fulfillment of the exclusive remedy. If the seller fails to effect the exclusive remedy, however, the
buyer might encounter consequential damages that were not foreseeable
when he assented to the exclusion of consequential damages. This result
clearly is not unconscionable when the seller's performance did not cause
the consequential damages in question or where the buyer freely and unconditionally accepted the risk of consequential damages.23
Accordingly, an exclusion of consequential damages should be unenforceable upon failure of essential purpose of an exclusive remedy only in
those cases where the seller's refusal or inability to perfect the exclusive
remedy directly caused consequential damages that the buyer did not
agree to assume.24 Only in this instance does the failure of essential purpose of the exclusive remedy render enforcement of the consequential
damages disclaimer unconscionable.
Unfortunately, cases dealing with the issue of the independent validity
of a consequential damages disclaimer have not applied this analysis.
Some jurisdictions have made the mistake noted earlier 25 by refusing to
view the continuing validity of a consequential damages disclaimer as an
thereof may be unconscionable the parties shall be afforded a reasonable opportunity to present evidence as to its commercial setting, purpose and effect
to aid the court in making the determination.
Although the section does not define unconscionability, Comment 1 states:
The basic test is whether, in the light of the general commercial background
and the commercial needs of the particular trade or case, the clauses involved
are so one-sided as to be unconscionable under the circumstances existing at
the time of the making of the contract. Subsection (2) makes it clear that it is
proper for the court to hear evidence upon these questions. The principle is
one of the prevention of oppression and unfair surprise . .. and not of disturbance of allocation of risks because of superior bargaining power.
(Emphasis added; citation omitted). See generally Ellinghaus, supra note 17, at 763-65; Leff,
supra note 17, at 489.
21. As noted earlier, the courts have relied on Comment I in applying § 2-719(2). See
note 11 supra. Thus, the test actually used by the courts in determining the validity of an
exclusive remedy is whether the buyer has retained the substantial value of the bargain. Id
22. "It is important to note that the language of the subsection 'is not concerned with
arrangements oppressive at their inception, but rather with the application of an agreement
to novel circumstances not contemplated by the parties.'" Anderson, supra note 15, at 76364 (quoting 1 REPORT OF THE NEW YORK LAW REVIEW COMMISSION FOR 1955, at 584)
(footnote omitted).
23. Anderson, supra note 15, at 776.
24. Id Professor Eddy indicates that in a consumer context enforcement of a consequential damages disclaimer may be per se unconscionable after the exclusive remedy fails
of its essential purpose. This suggestion is premised on the fact that a consumer ordinarily
will expect the exclusive remedy to be fulfilled and that the exclusion of consequential damages will be effective only when the exclusive remedy also is effective. Eddy, supra note 15,
at 91.
25. See note 19 supra and accompanying text.
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issue separate from failure of essential purpose of an exclusive remedy.26
Other jurisdictions more correctly apply the separate standards under subsections 2-719(2) and 2-719(3),27 but misidentify the factors that should
cause a consequential damages disclaimer to fail in light of failure of essential purpose of an exclusive remedy.
Most commonly this mistake is manifested by focusing attention on
whether the seller made a good faith effort to fulfill the exclusive remedy.28
For example, in Adams v. J. Case Co. 29 the seller took fifteen months to
effect a limited repair warranty pursuant to the sale of a tractor, thereby
causing the buyer to lose 810 work hours. In holding that the consequential damages disclaimer could no longer stand, the court apparently reasoned that, in light of the seller's willful refusal to repair, it would be
unconscionable to deny the buyer consequential damages.3 ° The court did
not discuss the causal connection between failure of the exclusive remedy's
essential purpose and the consequential damages, 3 ' nor was there any discussion of the bargaining context and allocation of risk for consequential
damages.3 2 Thus, although the exclusion of consequential damages may
26. See Beal v. General Motors Corp., 354 F. Supp. 423 (D. Del. 1973) (negligent failure to effect exclusive remedy of repairs or replacement in the sale of a truck held to make
available all remedies under the Code despite presence of a consequential damages disclaimer); Reynolds v. Preferred Mut. Ins. Co., II U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 701 (Mass. App. Div.
1972) (inability to effect exclusive remedy of repair in a contract for sale and installation of
gutters held to make available all Code remedies despite a consequential damages disclaimer). Professor Anderson points out that Beal and Reynolds might turn upon the fact
that in neither case was there a separate, consequential damages disclaimer nor explicit mention of the word consequential. Rather, the contracts merely limited the seller's liability to
repair or replacement of defective parts. Anderson, supra note 15, at 783-87.
27. See notes 20 & 21 supra and accompanying text.
28. See Koehring Co. v. A.P.I., Inc., 369 F. Supp. 882 (E.D. Mich. 1974); Jones & McKnight Corp. v. Birdsboro Corp., 320 F. Supp. 39 (N.D. II. 1970); Adams v. J.I. Case Co.,
125 Ill. App. 2d 388, 261 N.E.2d 1 (1970).
29. 125 Ill. App. 2d 388, 261 N.E.2d 1 (1970).
30. The court in Adams stated that:
[The] plaintiff could not have made his bargain and purchase with knowledge
that defendants would be unreasonable, . . . willfully dilatory or careless and
negligent in making good their warranty in the event of its breach. . . . It
should be obvious that they cannot at once repudiate their obligation under
their warranty and assert its provisions beneficial to them.
261 N.E.2d at 7-8. Most of the court's discussion was not this straightforward. Rather than
simply stating that enforcement of the consequential damages disclaimer would be unconscionable, the court stated that the seller's dilatory conduct constituted a breach of an implied warranty of prompt repairs. Id at 8. Breach of this implied warranty availed the
buyer of all other remedies provided by the Code despite the presence of a disclaimer of all
other warranties, express or implied. Id at 6.
31. For a discussion of the relevance of a nexus between failure of the essential purpose
of the exclusive remedy and occurrence of consequential damages, see notes 24 & 25 supra
and accompanying text.
32. Although no cases have discussed causal relationships in this context, there are cases
that have focused on the allocation of risk in determining whether a consequential damages
disclaimer has continuing validity after the essential purpose of an exclusive remedy fails.
Nevertheless, in Jones & McKnight Corp. v. Birdsboro Corp., 320 F. Supp. 39, 43 (N.D. I11.
1970), a case involving parties of substantially equal bargaining power in a commercial
transaction, the court quoted from Adams in holding that the consequential damages disclaimer could not stand in light of the seller's refusal to effect the exclusive remedy. Moreover, in Koehring Co. v. A.P.I., Inc., 369 F. Supp. 882 (E.D. Mich. 1974), the court falsely
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have been unconscionable in Adams, the court's discussion does not reveal
the necessary facts.3 3
Only one case to date, American ElectricPower Co. v. Westinghouse Electric Corp., has sustained a consequential damages disclaimer despite a
seller's refusal to perform an exclusive remedy. The product involved in
that case was a turbine generator described by the court as a "highly com35
plex, sophisticated, and in some ways experimental" piece of machinery.
After the turbine generator proved defective, the buyer brought suit alleging that the seller willfully refused to effect the limited repair warranty and
therefore that the consequential damages disclaimer was no longer enforceable. The court agreed that the exclusive remedy had failed of its
essential purpose, but it refused to grant consequential damages on
grounds that the contract was fully negotiated and the "agreed-upon allocation of commercial risk should not be disturbed. 3 6
II.

S.M. WILSON & Co. V. SMITH INTERNATIONAL, INC.

Against this background the Ninth Circuit decided S.M.Wilson & Co. v.
Smith International,Inc., thereby taking one more step towards judicial
understanding of the relationship between subsections 2-719(2) and 2719(3). 3' After disposing of Wilson's contention that there was an express
indicated that allocation of risks and a nexus between the failure of the essential purpose of
the exclusive remedy and occurrence of consequential damages are irrelevant by stating that
buyers "might not be entitled to additional remedies if they fail to prove that plaintiff [seller]
failed to repair and such failure was willfully dilatory." Id at 891.
33. Professor Anderson suggests that the courts in Adams and in Birdsboro may simply
have been trying to couch their decisions in the strongest terms by stressing the egregious
nature of the seller's conduct. This could explain the failure to discuss allocation of risks or
causal connections; it does not, however, explain the dictum in Koehring, see note 32 supra,
suggesting that buyers must prove willful refusal to honor the exclusive remedy before the
consequential damages disclaimer will fail. Anderson, supra note 15, at 779-80.
34. 418 F. Supp. 435 (S.D.N.Y. 1976).
35. Id at 458.
36. Id Other commercial cases have recognized that an exclusive remedy is totally separate from a consequential damages disclaimer. These cases did not, however, involve allegations of willful refusal to effect the exclusive remedy. See Potomac Elec. Power Co. v.
Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 385 F. Supp. 572 (D.D.C. 1974), rev'd and remanded, 527 F.2d
853 (D.C. Cir. 1975); U.S. Fibres, Inc. v. Proctor & Schwartz, Inc., 358 F. Supp. 449 (E.D.
Mich. 1972), afl'd, 509 F.2d 1043 (6th Cir. 1975); County Asphalt, Inc. v. Lewis Welding &
Eng'r Corp., 323 F. Supp. 1300 (S.D.N.Y. 1970), aj7'd on other grounds, 444 F.2d 372 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 939 (1971). Professors Anderson and Eddy disagree over the
correctness of the decisions in this line of commercial cases. Professor Eddy indicates that
failure of the essentialpurpose of an exclusive remedy should have no bearing on the validity of a consequential damages disclaimer in cases in which the parties have fully and freely
allocated the risk of such damages. Eddy, supra note 15, at 90-91. Professor Anderson, by
contrast, states that these decisions are correct only if breach of the exclusive remedy was not
the proximate cause of the consequential damages. Nevertheless, Professor Anderson notes
that causation may be irrelevant to a determination of conscionability in experimental goods
cases such as American Elee. Power Co. This assertion is based on the premise that in
purchasing complex and experimental goods subject to a consequential damages disclaimer
the buyer implicitly accepts the risk of damages stemming from the experimental nature of
the goods. With regard to the purchase of standard products, however, a buyer assumes that
consequential damages will be averted by fulfilling the exclusive remedy. Anderson, supra
note 15, at 780-81.
37. Professor Eddy emphasizes that an understanding of the relationship between §§ 2-
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warranty of proper installation separate and distinct from the limited warranty of materials and workmanship,38 the court directed its attention to
whether the exclusive remedy of repair or replacement had failed of its
essential purpose.3 9 A relatively easy decision in the affirmative4" raised
the more difficult issue as to what effect this failure would have on the
consequential damages disclaimer.4 '
Wilson argued that under the line of cases beginning with Adams v. J.
Case Co.4 2 failure of the essential purpose of the exclusive remedy eliminates any limitations on liability and reinstates all remedies provided by
the Code.4 3 Smith International, by contrast, argued that continuing validity of the consequential damages disclaimer depends upon the contractual allocation of risks." Smith International distinguished Adams45 as
arising in a consumer context and involving sellers who willfully refused to
repair. 6 The Ninth Circuit was persuaded by this distinction and turned
to the commercial cases, beginning with County Asphalt, Inc. v. Lewis
719(2) and 2-719(3) involves three steps. The first step was taken in the line of commercial
cases recognizing that an exclusive remedy is separate from a consequential damages disclaimer. See note 36 supra. The second step will be reached when courts recognize that the
issues in §§ 2-719(2) and 2-719(3) are disparate and that a single rule applicable to both
subsections is not necessary. The third step will be reached when courts begin analyzing the
conscionability of consequential damages disclaimers independently on a case-by-case basis.
Eddy, supra note 15, at 92.
38. See note 2 supra. For a discussion of the relationship between "workmanship" and
"installation," see notes 57 & 58 infra and accompanying text.
39. 587 F.2d at 1374.
40. The court quoted from Professor Eddy's article in deciding that the exclusive remedy had failed of its essential purpose:
This rosy picture of the limited repair warranty, however, rests upon at least
three assumptions: that the warrantor will diligently make repairs, that such
repairs will indeed "cure" the defects, and that consequential loss in the interim will be negligible. So long as these assumptions hold true, the limited
remedy appears to operate fairly .

. .

. But when one of these assumptions

proves false in a particular case, the purchaser may find that the substantial
benefit of the bargain has been lost.
Id at 1375 (quoting Eddy, supra note 15, at 63). The essential purpose of the exclusive
remedy in S.M. Wilson & Co. failed on both the second and third assumptions enunciated
by Professor Eddy.
41. Id
42. For a discussion of this line of cases, see notes 28-31 supra and accompanying text.
Also cited favorably by Wilson were Kohlenberger, Inc. v. Tyson's Food, Inc., 510 S.W.2d
555 (Ark. 1974); Orr Chevrolet, Inc. v. Courtney, 488 S.W.2d 883 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1972, no writ); and Ehlers v. Chrysler Motor Corp., 226 N.W.2d 157 (S.D. 1975).
43. Wilson failed to recognize that the dispositive issue was conscionability. Although
the commercial setting may have caused it to shy away from arguing that enforcement of the
consequential damages disclaimer would be unconscionable, it could have argued unconscionability on the ground that failure of the essential purpose of the exclusive remedy
caused the consequential damages that both parties thought the exclusive remedy would
prevent when they entered into the contract. See notes 24 & 25 supra and accompanying
text.
44. Smith International's argument appears to be a restatement of Professor Eddy's argument that failure of the essential purpose of an exclusive remedy is irrelevant to the conscionability of a consequential damages disclaimer in cases where the parties fully
negotiated the contract and had relatively equal bargaining powers. See note 36 supra.
45. See also notes 28-31 & 42 supra.
46. Unfortunately, Smith International muddied the waters of an otherwise cogent argument by stressing the importance of its good faith effort to repair. While this clearly puts
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Welding & Engineering Corp.,47 as proper authority.4 8 The remainder of
the court's discussion of section 2-719 analyzed the bargaining context of
the transaction.4 9 Ultimately, three factors combined in persuading the
court to sustain the exclusion of consequential damages: (1) the fact that
both parties enjoyed relatively equal bargaining power and freely negotiated the risk of loss,"° (2) the complex nature of the tunnel boring
machine, 5 1 and (3) Smith International's repeated efforts to repair.5 2 The
court concluded its discussion of section 2-719 by warning that its decision
was based upon the facts "and is not intended to establish that a consea failure of the limited repair remquential damages bar always survives
53
edy to serve its essential purpose."
Judge Enright, dissenting, stated that the dispositive issue regarding the
exclusion of consequential damages was whether the parties intended the
exclusive remedy and consequential damages disclaimer to shift the risk of
damages resulting from improper installation to Wilson.54 He concluded
that they did not so intend, stating that the contractual obligation to provide a competent tunnel boring specialist to supervise installation was a
condition precedent to the exclusive remedy, and therefore the consethe seller in a more favorable posture, it does not bear logical relevance to the validity of the
consequential damages disclaimer. See notes 32 & 33 supra and accompanying text.
47. 323 F. Supp. 1300 (S.D.N.Y. 1970), af'don other grounds, 444 F.2d 372 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 404 U.S. 939 (1971); see note 36 supra.
48. Although the appellee's brief did not mention American Elec. Power Co., that is the
strongest case in support of Smith International and is distinguishable only in that the consequential damages in American Elec. Power Co. may implicitly have been attributed to the
experimental nature of the goods.
49. 587 F.2d at 1375-76.
50. See notes 24, 25 & 36 supra and accompanying text.
51. The importance attributed to the complex nature of the machinery is unclear. The
court states only that "[t]he machine was a complex piece of equipment designed for the
buyer's purposes." 587 F.2d at 1375. Nevertheless, the tunnel boring machine was not an
experimental good such as that involved in American Elec. Power Co. Thus, the consequential damages could not have been caused by defects attributable to qualities for which neither
party could have reasonable expectations as opposed to defects that both parties expected to
be cured by the exclusive remedy. See note 36 supra. Perhaps the court reasoned that in the
sale of complex machinery, the buyer should reasonably foresee that unrepairable defects
will be discovered, and therefore it would not be unconscionable to retain the consequential
damages disclaimer. This rationale is persuasive only if the defects responsible for the consequential damages could not be cured within a reasonable time. In S.M. Wilson & Co.,
however, repair clearly was a viable remedy for the defective tunnel boring machine. (All
that was necessary to correct the machine's operation was reversal of the thrust rollers and
one of its 10 Staffa motors. 587 F.2d at 1368.) Consequently, the court appears to be
stressing the complex nature of the machinery not as a causation factor, but rather to clarify
the bargaining context.
52. The court indicated that if Smith International had refused to repair, then the consequential damages disclaimer would fail: "The seller Smith did not ignore his obligation to
repair; he simply was unable to perform it. This is not enough to require that the seller
absorb losses the buyer plainly agreed to bear." 587 F.2d at 1375. This dictum is a step back
from American Electric Power Co., which recognized that the seller's good faith effort at
repair is not decisive of the validity of a consequential damages disclaimer. See notes 34-36
supra and accompanying text.
53. 587 F.2d at 1375-76.
54. Wilson argued that there was an express warranty of proper installation, the fulfillment of which was a condition precedent to validity of the exclusive remedy and consequential damages disclaimer. See note 6 supra.

NOTES

1979]

quential damages disclaimer never became effective."
This rationale was based on the conditional clause in the warranty providing that the workmanship and materials warranty was to be effective
"if, but only if" the machine has been properly installed and operated.5 6
The majority, on the other hand, reasoned that the conditional clause was
inserted to protect Smith from liability attributable to faulty assembly or
operation when Wilson personnel were not under Smith's supervision. 7
In essence, Judge Enright disagreed with the majority's position that a
"workmanship and materials" warranty encompasses installation. 8 Thus,
according to Judge Enright, when an exclusive remedy is attached to a
"workmanship and materials" warranty, any obligation regarding installation must be fulfilled before the exclusive remedy or limitations on liability
come into effect.59
III.

CONCLUSION

In SM. Wilson & Co., the Ninth Circuit faced the issue of the continuing validity of a consequential damages disclaimer in light of failure of
essential purpose of an exclusive remedy. Case law prior to S.M. Wilson &
Co. was confused at best; some cases held that the consequential damages
disclaimer automatically failed with the failure of the essential purpose of
the exclusive remedy, while other cases focused on the seller's conduct.
S.M. Wilson & Co. looked to the seller's efforts at fulfilling the exclusive
remedy. This case, however, marks the first time that a circuit court has
joined American Electric Power Co. in recognizing the separability of subsections 2-719(2) and 2-719(3) by focusing on the contractual allocation of
risks and conscionability in the total bargaining context. Moreover, S.M.
Wilson & Co. is a more direct statement of the relationship between subsections 2-719(2) and 2-719(3) than American Electric Power Co., which
may be distinguished on the basis of the experimental nature of the goods
involved. The next step to an understanding of section 2-719 will be a
recognition that unconscionability is present only in those cases where failure of the essential purpose of the exclusive remedy is the direct cause of
the consequential damages beyond those that the buyer agreed to assume.
John V Jansonius

55. 587 F.2d at 1377; see note 2 supra.
56. See note 2 supra.
57. 587 F.2d at 1371.
58. The majority's position is based on the argument that since assembly at the factory
clearly is "workmanship," so should installation at the jobsite be included within the meaning of workmanship. Id at 1372.
59. Id at137

